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AN ANALYSIS OF SELECTED PROBLEMS
ARISING FROM THE NINETY DAY LETTER
James L. Edgar*
United States Courts have heard numerous cases in the field
of federal income, estate, and gift taxation, concerning the pro-
cedural aspects of the statutory notice of deficiency,1 commonly
referred to as the "ninety day letter." The ninety day letter is
the taxpayer's passport to the Tax Court. Without it the taxpayer
*BA., Oklahoma State University, cannot litigate in that forum, nor
L.L.B., The University of Tulsa; can the Commissioner assess and
member of the Oklahoma Bar As- collect a deficiency. Thus, the
sociation; Certified Public Ac- problems arising from this letter
countant. are most difficult for the practi-
tioner. If the taxpayer receives a ninety day letter that appears
defective, either as to the last known address or method of trans-
mittal, he has two alternatives. If he files a timely petition with
the Tax Court, he may waive the defect. If he does not file a
1 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6212 concerning notice of deficiency reads
as follows:
(a) In General
If the Secretary or his delegate determines that there is a deficiency in
respect of any tax imposed by subtitles A or B, he is authorized to send
notice of such deficiency to the taxpayer by certified mail or registered mail.
(b) Address for Notice of Deficiency
(1) Income and gift taxes.-In the absence of notice to the Secretary
or his delegate under section 6903 of the existence of a fiduciary relationship,
notice of a deficiency in respect of a tax imposed by subtitle A or chapter 12,
if mailed to the taxpayer at his last known address, shall be sufficient for
purposes of subtitle A, chapter 12, and this chapter even if such taxpayer is
deceased, or is under a legal disability, or, in the case of a corporation, has
terminated its existence.
(2) joint income tax return.-In the case of a joint income tax return
filed by husband and wife, such notice of deficiency may be a single joint
notice, except that if the Secretary or his delegate has been notified by either
spouse that separate residences have been established, then, in lieu of the
single joint notice, a duplicate original of the joint notice shall be sent by
certified mail or registered mail to each spouse at his last known address.
(3) Estate tax.-In the absence of notice to the Secretary or his dele-
gate under section 6903 of the existence of a fiduciary relationship, notice
1
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timely petition, then he may have to pay the tax, and sue in Dis-
trict Court for a refund. Questions often arise as to whether the
taxpayer is entitled to injunctive relief2 and as to whether the
period of limitations has been suspended by proper assessment
procedure.3 It is evident, then, that a number of vital interests
of the taxpayer are determined by the validity of the notice of
deficiency.
Various disputes may arise over the authority of the Com-
missioner's ninety day letter. If the letter as originally sent
by registered mail fails for lack of compliance with the statute,
the Commissioner is- faced with the decision of whether to un-
dertake some form of manual delivery. Since manual or actual
delivery is of questionable validity under the statute, the Com-
missioner always incurs the possibility of litigation. The taxpayer,
on the other hand, is faced with the problem of what disposition
to make of a notice of deficiency which he considers to be un-
lawfully served upon him. Considerable litigation has resulted
from the fact that there is no real definition of the term 'last
known address", which raises the question of whether the taxpay-
er has given notice to the Commissioner sufficient to have put the
Commissioner in a position that he cannot deny knowledge of the
new address. While these categories do not encompass all of
the problems which might arise in connection with the ninety
day letter, they are the problems which will be discussed in this
article.
PROBLEMS IN REGARD TO ACTUAL DELIVERY
Generally the Tax Court has no jurisdiction unless the notice
of deficiency is sent to the taxpayer at his last known address 4 by
registered mail in accordance With the statute. This rule, in con-
formity with other tax rules, is not universal in its application,
of a deficiency in respect of a tax imposed by chapter 11, if addressed in
the name of the decedent or other person subject to liability and mailed to
his last known address, shall be sufficient for purposes of chapter 11 and
of this chapter.
(c) Further Deficiency Letters Restricted
(1) General rule.-If the Secretary or his delegate has mailed to the
taxpayer a notice of deficiency as provided in subsection (a), and the tax-
payer files a petition with the Tax Court within the time prescribed in section
6213(a), the Secretary or his delegate shall have no right to determine any
additional deficiency of income tax for the same taxable year, of gift tax for
the same calendar year, or of estate tax in respect of the taxable estate of the
same decedent, except in the case of fraud, and except as provided in section
6214(a) (relating to assertion of greater deficiencies before the Tax Court),
in section 6213(b) (1) (relating to mathematical errors), or in section
6861(c) (relating to the making of jeopardy assessments).
2 Slaven v. United States, No. 14132-WB, S.D. Cal., Oct. 21, 1952; 45 Am.
Fed. Tax R. 1256.
3 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6502, 6503.
4 See Brodsky, Adequacy of Notice of Deficiency, N. Y. U. 18~t LTsT-
Trorr oN FiE. TAx (1960).
L¢ol. 1, No. I
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and may be applied differently, or not applied at all, depending
on the forum. In numerous instances, the question has arisen as
to whether some other type of actual notice will suffice if the
taxpayer is not damaged thereby. The early case of Olsen v.
Helvering5 held that the purpose of the notice of deficiency is
to advise the taxpayer who is to pay the deficiency that the
Commissioner means to assess him, and any notice which un-
equivocally accomplishes this purpose is good. This Second Cir-
cuit decision is clearly contrary to a literal reading of the statute.
The statute and the cases construing it have, through the years,
served as a basis for numerous lawsuits.
In 1951, the Sixth Circuit case of Commissioner v. Stewart
used the same reasoning as the Olsen case and indicated that the
provisions of the statute need not be literally complied with. The
court felt that Section 6212(a) of the 1954 Code was not man-
datory in its application, and that actual receipt of the notice,
coupled with a timely petition to the Tax Court, would indicate
a waiver of defects in the statutory scheme of notice.
The Ninth Circuit met the issue of actual notice in the case
of Boren v. Riddell.7 The Commissioner mailed a notice of de-
ficiency by ordinary mail, which was received by the taxpayer
on the following day. The taxpayer contended that the assess-
ment was invalid since it did not fulfill the statute literally. The
court pointed out that the statute now does not limit the manner
in which notice may be sent, but merely authorizes the mailing
of deficiency notices by registered mail. The court indicated that
the time limit for filing a petition to the Tax Court would begin
with the receipt of notice in such cases. This theory was adopted
by the court in two later cases.8
Commissioner v. Rosenheim,9 a case from the Third Circuit,
expressed doubt that actual service will suffice when the original
registered notice fails. Here the original registered letter was re-
turned to the Commissioner undelivered. It was then hand deliv-
ered to the taxpayer. The taxpayer filed a timely petition to the
Board of Tax Appeals, contending that the original notice was
void and that the board lacked jurisdiction. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals went to great lengths to establish that the original
notice was valid. It is submitted that a much easier result would
be to hold that if a taxpayer actually received notice, he would
be precluded from challenging the courts jurisdiction. The fact
that this court did not base its decision on actual service indicates
that hand delivery was not acceptable to invoke the jurisdiction
588 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1937).
6186 F.2d 239 (6th Cir. 1951).
7241 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1957).
s Cohen v. United States, 297 F.2d 760 (9fha Cir. 1962); Tenzer v Com-
missioner, 285 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1960).
9 132 F.2d 677 (3d Cir. 1942).
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of the Board of Tax Appeals. At least one Tax Court decision is to
the same effect.'0
A recent Ninth Circuit case has created considerable un-
certainty as to the need in that circuit for literal compliance with
the statute.
In Rosewood Hotel, Inc. v. Commissioner, the court quoted
the following statement from the decision of the Tax Court below:
"[The Tax Court3 . ..would have no jurisdiction . . . if
the notice of deficiency was not mailed to the petitioner's
ilast known address within the knowledge of the Commis-
sioner but was mailed by registered mail to some other ad-
dress, was returned to the sender by the post office, and then
was delivered to the petitioner by some way other than by
registered mail . . .-"
The Circuit Court did not specifically rebut the statement,
but merely remanded the case to the Tax Court with instructions
to state the reason for dismissal. If they had believed actual
service would suffice, then it would have been proper to remand
with instructions dismissing in favor of the Commissioner, since the
taxpayer admitted that he had received actual notice, and was
basing his case solely on the alleged defective registered letter.
Thus, there is indication in the Ninth Circuit that other types of
actual delivery will not invoke the jurisdiction of the Tax Court.
The Tax Court has given indication that it does not agree
with the philosophy propounded in the Olsen, Stewart, and Boren
cases. In the case of John W. Heaberlin12 the original notice of
deficiency was defective. The taxpayer personally went to the
post office, where the notice was hand delivered to him by p6stal
authorities. The language in that case indicates that a prbper
notice was never given, even though notice was given to him in
person. On the other hand, the Tax Court seems to have gone
along with the liberal interpretation of the statute in the case of
Clement Brzezinski.'3 There the statute was interpreted to mean
that the notice is proper when received by the taxpayer in "due
process" of mailing, even though not sent to the last known address.
From an analysis of the above decisions, there is indication
that legal thinking is evolving toward a liberal construction of
6212(a). This is especially true in the Court of the Second and
Sixth Circuits which have cases clearly in point. Although the
Tax Court decisions are extremely confusing, the case of Clement
Brzezinski indicates that they may be essentially in accord with
the Circuit Courts if the issue presents itself clearly. The reports
of the Senate Finance Committee 4 reveal that sending of the
1OAbrabam Goldstein, 22 T.C. 1233 (1954).
11275 F.2d 786, 787-788 (9th Cir. 1960).
3234 T.C. 58 (1960).
1s23 T.C. 192 (1954).
14S. REP. No. 1983, 85th, Cong. 2d Sess. 102 (1958).
WVol. 1, No. I
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notice by registered mail is compulsory upon the Commissioner,
and that the word "authorized" as used in the statute, means that
the Commissioner is authorized to send a notice of deficiency, but
once he decides to send it, he is bound to send it by registered
mail, to the last known address.
Better reasoning seems to be on the side which advocates
a liberal construction, since, in any legal proceeding, the courts
are generally concerned only with the question whether the
litigants received notice of sufficient character so as not to be
prejudiced thereby. Courts will undoubtedly come more and more
to adapt this philosophy in future years. If the theory of the
Stewart, Boren, and Olsen cases is accepted by other tribunals, the
litigation in regard to last known address will be minimized, for
the Commissioner normally gives some type of actual notice, even
though originally the ninety day letter may not technically have
been sent to the last known address by registered mail.
METHODS OF ATTACKING A QUESTIONABLE NOTICE
In numerous instances, when the taxpayer is confronted with
a notice of deficiency mailed contrary to the provisions of the
statute, he chooses a policy of recognizing the notice and attack-
ing its validity by virtue of a timely Tax Court petition.15 Many
times, cases of this nature depend on the question of waiver,16
and the court holds that, if a timely petition is filed, then the
alleged defects in the notice are waived. Other cases hold that the
timely petition itself indicates adequate notice.'7
The case of William M. Greve18 provided one of the first judi-
cial utterances on the question of waiver and estoppel. In that
case, the petitioner stated on his return that his address was New
York, New York. The Commissioner mailed the notice of deficiency
to Brooklyn, New York. A petition was filed by the taxpayer to
the Board of Tax Appeals for the purpose of having the board
rule on the question of jurisdiction. In dismissing the case in
favor of the taxpayer, the court stated, "In this case, there has
been neither waiver nor estoppel, but an unwaivering insistence
by the taxpayer that there was no proper notice of deficiency."
Thus, from the Greve case, the rule was derived that a taxpayer
could challenge the authority of a notice of deficiency by a timely
petition. This liberal rule, however, did not long withstand the
onslaught of judicial process without some amendment. The ques-
tion of waiver again was at issue in the 1942 case of Commissioner
v. Rosenheim.19 The petitioner in that case filed with the Board
of Tax Appeals within ninety days after the mailing of the alleged
5 William M. Greve. 37 B.T.A. 450 (1938).
16 Commissioner v. Rosenheim, 132 F.2d 677 (3d Cir. 1Q42).
17 Clement Brzezinski, 23 T.C. 192 (1954).
1837 B.T.A. 450 (1938).
19 132 F.2d 677 (3d Cir. 1942).
19643
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defective notice. Petitioner contended in her petition that the Tax
Court had no jurisdiction, since the Commissioner had not mailed
notice to her last known address. The Circuit Court for the Third
Circuit held that she had waived any defect in jurisdiction by
the filing of a timely petition. This decision was followed in Estate
of George F. Hurd" where the Tax Court held that if a notice is
received in due process of mailing, even though, the notice may
not be technically sent to the last known address, a timely petition
will waive the defects in jurisdiction. The ultimate application
of the waiver-estoppel theory appeared in the Tax Court's dicta
in Marjorie F. Birnie.21 The court there stated that a petitioner, by
the filing of a timely petition, "does not waive all errors or irregu-
larities in the notice, but may obtain a dismissal for lack of juris-
diction upon a showing that there was an error or irregularity of
sufficient magnitude to nullify the notice." The judicial thinking
appears to have evolved from an extremely liberal attitude in the
Greve case, to a rather harsh attitude in Rosenheim, and then to
have settled in the middle in Marjorie F. Birnie. The Tax Court,
under the dicta of Marjorie F. Birnie, looks to the facts and
circumstances of each particular case to determine whether there
was sufficient prejudice upon the petitioner to nullify the notice.
In this respect they decide the ultimate question of fact and such
decision determines the taxpayer's right to litigate in the Tax Court.
It is apparent that if the taxpayer recognizes the notice and files
a timely petition, he allows the court to apply the two most ex-
treme alternatives. The court may either adjudicate the case on
the merits or hold that the Commissioner cannot recover the tax
because of improper assessment procedure.
A large amount of litigation, concerns cases in which the tax-
payer failed to file a petition within ninety days after the mailing
of the alleged defective notice of deficiency. Historically, this
situation involves motions to dismiss on the part of both parties
for lack of jurisdiction. The Commissioner alleges that the petition
was not filed within the ninety day limit, and the taxpayer alleges
that a proper assessment has never been made, therefore, no case
or controversy exists.22
The general rule arising from these cases is that the Tax Court
must deny the motion and state the reason therefor.23 If the dis-
missal is entered on the motion of the Commissioner, then he is
free to collect the tax. If the motion of the taxpayer is sustained,
the Commissioner is denied the assessment in that particular case,
and is forced to start the assessment process anew.
20 9 T.C. 681 (1947).
2116 T.C. 681 (1951).22 Maxfield v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 325 (9th Cir. 1946); Rosewood
Hotel, Inc. v. Commissioner, 275 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1960); Abraham Gold-
stein, 22 T.C. 1233 (1954).2 3 Rosewood Hotel, Inc. v. Commissioner, 275 F.2d 786, (9th Cir. 1960);
D'Andrea v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 904 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
W~ol. 1, No. I
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As a third alternative, when faced with a questionable notice
of deficiency, the taxpayer may initiate a suit in Federal District
Court to enjoin collection of the tax. This was done successfully,
for example, in the case of Barack v. United States.24 In using this
alternative, the taxpayer waits for the attempted assessment on
the part of the Commissioner, and thereby foregoes possible Tax
Court litigation on the merits.
The taxpayer, therefore, when served with an improper no-
tice, has three rather unattractive alternatives. The relative merits
and pitfalls of the three should be given close consideration be-
fore the decision is made to file a petition to the Tax Court.
LAST KNOWN ADDRESS-IMPUTATION
OF KNOWLEDGE TO COMMISSIONER
Section 6212(b) (1) provides that a notice of a deficiency of
income and gift taxes mailed to the taxpayer at his last known
address is sufficient, even though the taxpayer is deceased, or is
under a legal disability, or in the case of a corporation, has ter-
minated its existence. A similar provision is in effect for estate
taxes.25
Through the years, there have been infinite problems in de-
fending "last known address." The cases are reasonably uniform
in holding that the last known address is that address which is
given to responsible agents of the Commissioner. This point was
adjudicated early in the history of our tax litigation in the case
of Welch v. Schweitzer.28 There, a taxpayer changed his address
after his return was filed. The agent called on him at his new
address and reported to his supervisors that the taxpayer had
changed addresses. The agent filed other reports, one of which
was mailed directly to the Commissioner. Nevertheless a notice
was sent to the former address. The court held for the taxpayer
in that instance, and ruled that the Commissioner should have
knowledge of the new address.
In Maxfield v. Commissioner 7 the Ninth Circuit held that
the knowledge of the field agent would prevail over the fact that
a taxpayer used another address on her returns and on a protest
filed by her. They affirmed the rule of Welch v. Schweitzer, by
holding that the knowledge of the Commissioner's agents or busi-
ness organization is attributable to the Commissioner. To the
same effect are the cases of Baraclk v. United States,28 and Gennaro
A. Carbone.29
2 4 No. 10394(1), E.D. Mo., Oct 11, 1956, 51 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1350;
Shanghai Realty Dev. Co. v. Hanington, Civil No. 58983, D.C., Jan. 21,
1958, 1 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1159.25 INT. Bxv. CODE OF 1954, § 6212(b) (3).
28106 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1939); accord, Luhring v. Glotzback, 304 F.2d
556 (4th Cr. 1962).
27153 F.2d 325 (9th Cir. 1946).
28 No. 10394(1), E.D. Mo., Oct. 11, 1956, 51 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1350.
298 T.C. 207 (1947).
19643
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Considerable difficulty ensues when there is attempted notifi-
cation of the Commissioner by any source other than by direct
and actual knowledge of his field agents.80 Mere letters of cor-
respondence to the Commissioner have proved to be a completely
inadequate means of notifying the Commissioner of a change in
address. The following methods have been questioned in our courts,
and have been deemed to have given ineffective notice to the
Commissioner of such change:
1. The filing in a new district of returns for subsequent years,
paying the same type of tax, specifically stating that there is a
new address and referring to the former district in which prior
years' returns were filed."'
2. Direct letters to the Commissioner or his agent in ref-
erence to another type of tax, informing the Commissioner or his
agent of a change in address.8 2
3. The filing of affidavits in connection with the tax under
litigation, stating that the taxpayer now has a new address.8 3
4. A request for extension of time in connection with the tax
under litigation, such request being made specifically for the reas-
on that the taxpayer has moved to a new address.8 4
5. The filing with the Commissioner of a protest giving the
new address of the taxpayer.85
6. The listing of the new address in the telephone directory.80
7. Seizure by a communist country of the territory which was
reported as the address of the taxpayer on his latest income tax
return.8 7
On the other hand, the following have been considered by the
courts to indicate that sufficient notice has been given to the
Commissioner:
1. The filing of returns for other types of tax with the same
District Director.8
2. The filing in the same district, of returns for subsequent
years, giving the new address.80
3. The statement of the new address on waivers extending
the time in which the District Director may assess, such waivers
being filed in the same district as the tax under litigation.40
80 Joseph Marcus, 12 T.C. 1071 (1949).
81Joseph Marcus, supra. note 30; Clark's Estate v. Commissioner, 173
F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1949); Luhring v. Glotzbach, 304 F.2d 560 (4th Cir. 1962.82 Commissioner v. Rosenheim, 132 F.2d 677 (3d Cir. 1942); Clark)s
Estate v. Commissioner, supra note 31.
83 Clark's Estate v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 13 (24 Cir. 1949).
34 ibid.
35 Ibid.3 6 George F. Hurd, 9 T.C. 681 (1947).
37Shanghai Realty Dev. Co. v. Harrintgon, Civil No. 58983, D.C. Jan.
21, 1958, 1 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1159.38 Slaven v. United States, 14132-WB, S.D. Cal., Oct. 21, 1952; 45 Am.
Fed. Tax RI. 1256.
89 ibid.4oAbraham Goldstein, 22 T.C. 1233 (1954).
WVol. 1, No. I
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It should be noted that in none of the cited cases have the
courts adjudicated that proper notice was given when the in-
strument attempting to give notice was filed in a district other
than that where the return for the year in question was filed.
The filing of instruments in the same district, informing the Com-
missioner of a change in address, has been the only means which
the courts have accepted other than direct knowledge on the part
of the field agents. The weight of the case law in respect to at-
tempted notification by documents is heavily in favor of the Com-
missioner. This writer believes, however, that with the introduction
of new electronic data processing equipment, the courts might
well limit the power of the Commissioner to ignore affidavits, tax
returns, and other types of documents. It would seem reasonable
to place a greater burden on the Commissioner in this respect.
Cases of the future can be expected to amend the doctrine laid
down in the Marcus, Clark, and Hurd decisions, due to the fact
that the Commissioner now has new means with which to discover
the true identity and last address of the taxpayer.
POWERS OF ATTORNEY
In numerous instances, the authority of the Commissioner to
assess the tax has depended upon the validity of a power of at-
torney as a means of notifying the Commissioner of a change in
address. One of the earliest decisions regarding the power of at-
torney was Bert D. Parker.41 In that case, the power of attorney
directed all correspondence, documents, warrants, or other data
connected in any way with the income tax, to be sent in care of
the attorney. The deficiency notice in question was sent to the
personal address of the taxpayer, which was also recited in the
power of attorney. A mere copy of the notice was sent to the at-
torney. The taxpayer filed a petition in the Tax Court challenging
the validity of the deficiency notice. Ruling on extremely narrow
grounds in the case, the court seemingly overlooked all principles
of agency, and held that the words "his last known address" as
used in the statute meant exactly what they said. They ignored the
finding that various agents of the Treasury Department had pre-
viously used the attorney's address in lieu of the taxpayer's, and
ruled that since the power of attorney did not explicitly state
notices of deficiencies must be addressed to the attorney the Com-
missioner could not be required to send notice to his address. The
court felt that actual receipt of the registered letter by the taxpayer
was very important, and followed the theory that if a notice is re-
ceived in due process of mailing, even though wrongfully addressed,
it is effective.
In 1958, in the case of United States v. Williams,43 an Ohio
4112 T.C. 1079 (1949).
4 2 INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 272(k).
4S164 F.Supp. 874 (S.D. Ohio 1958).
19643
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District Court ruled directly contra to the Parker case. There the
decedent had filed a power of attorney with the District Director,
directing all communications relative to tax matters be mailed to
his counsel. When the Commissioner sent a ninety day letter to the
attorney, and made a subsequent assessment, the executrix disal-
lowed the claim, contending that the notice had not been sent to
the decedents last known address. The court ruled that the Com-
missioner was correct in using the address of the attorney, which
was made mandatory by the power. This reasoning has been sub-
stantiated by D'Andrea v. Commissioner,44 a very recent decision
in the D. C. Circuit. In D'Andrea, the Commissioner sent a notice
of deficiency by registered mail to the taxpayer, and a copy to the
taxpayer's attorney. The registered letter was not delivered to the
taxpayer, but was returned to the Commissioner. The Commissioner
filed a motion to dismiss a subsequent Tax Court petition, on
ground that the petition was untimely filed and contending that,
even though not actually received, the notice of deficiency was
valid since it was sent to the taxpayer's last known address. The
power, virtually identical to that filed in the Parker case, recited
the taxpayer's own home address, and then directed all corres-
pondence, documents, warrants, or other data in connection with
the tax under litigation be sent in care of the attorney. The court
concluded that the registered letter sent to the petitioner was not
sent to the last known address and that the letter sent to the at-
torney was insufficient since it was sent by ordinary mail. The court
made it clear that they were refuting the Parker reasoning by stat-
ing: "This instrument begins with the petitioner's then present ad-
dress, and closes with the clear designation of a new one. The latter
was thereafter the address last known to the Commissioner." A very
recent case in the Eighth Circuit has applied the lVilliams and
D'Andrea reasoning.45
The discussion of the Williams, Parker and D'Andrea deci-
sions involves powers of attorney in which the power explicitly
states that all correspondence is to be mailed to the attorney. There
has been considerable litigation relative to powers of attorney
which did not direct that all correspondence be addressed to
counsel.
In Clement Brzezinski,46 the taxpayer communicated with the
Commissioner requesting a copy of all communications be ad-
dressed to his attorney. The Commissioner sent the ninety day let-
ter by registered mail to the attorney. The court found as an
ultimate fact that the last known address was the personal resi-
dence of the petitioners, and the Commissioner was not authorized
to send the notice to the attorney. However, the decision was for
44 263 F.2d 904 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
4 5 Kisting v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 264 (8th Cir. 1962).
4623 T.C. 192 (1954).
[Vol. 1, No. 1
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the Commissioner for the notice was received in due course of
mailing.
A somewhat novel approach to the authority of a power of
attorney occurred in the case of Estate of George F. Hurd.47 The
executrix there had filed a power of attorney naming a law firm,
but failing to direct that all correspondence be addressed to the
firm. No other address was given on the power of attorney except
that of the law firm. The court held that the Commissioner was
not bound to use the address of the attorneys, even though it was
the only one given on the power. This disagrees, to some extent,
with the Parker decision which was based solely on conflict of ad-
dresses within the power.
One might expect the courts in the future to take greater notice
of powers of attorney which direct that all correspondence be sent
to the taxpayer's counsel. Recent cases indicate that the Commis-
sioner must use this address for notices of deficiency. In cases which
do not direct that all correspondence be sent to the attorney, the
Commissioner will continue to have a reasonable choice as to
whether he mails the notice to the taxpayer or his counsel.
It is anticipated by this writer that, as the methods of the In-
ternal Revenue Service become more mechanized, the problems
in regard to the ninety day letter will decrease. At the present time,
however, they present questions of vital importance to a taxpayer
facing the assessment of tax.
4 7 George F. Hurd, 9 T.C. 681 (1947).
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